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Confidentiality in Mediation
Jaime Alison Lee & Carl Giesler
Paranzino v. Barnett Bank, 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); and Bernard v. Galen Group, 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
As mediation has become a more widely practiced method of dispute resolution, many jurisdictions have enacted rules 1 forbidding
participants to divulge information discussed during the mediation. 2
Two recent cases, Paranzino v. Barnett Bank3 and Bernard v. Galen
Group,4 are among the first to deal with the enforcement of such
rules by judicial sanction. In both cases, participants in judiciallyrequired mediations were severely sanctioned for breaching confidentiality in violation of mediation rules and/or court orders.
This case comment will argue that strong judicial commitment to
confidentiality is critical to the success of the mediation process as a
means of dispute resolution. However, it also will argue that severe
sanctions such as those imposed in Bernard and Paranzino are an
inappropriate means of compelling confidentiality, unless they are
applied within a framework of carefully deliberated and well-crafted
rules that fully address the issue's complexity. Valid exceptions to
1. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and the Public, J. DISP. REsOL. 1 (1995); Kent L. Brown, Comment.
Confidentiality in Mediation, Status and Implications, J. DISP. REsoL. 307, 307
(1991); Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality a Closer Leol:, in ABA SPECIAL COW.UT.
TEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTICIONER'S
GUIDE 47, 49 (Lawrence Freedman et al. eels., 1995). See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-2238 (1994) (general), and 25-381.16 (1994) (divorce); CAL. Cw. PRoe. CODE
§ 1297.371 (West Supp. 1994) (international commercial disputes); CAL. Evm. CODE
§1152.2 (West Supp. 1994) (general); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§44.101(3) (West Supp. 1994)
(family), 44.102 (West Supp. 1994) (courl-ordered mediation).
2. These mandates expand on the confidentiality protections given to the mediation process by both common law admissibility doctrine and by state and federal rules
of evidence. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that
party's admissions during a court-mandated mediation were not admissible during
subsequent trial on grounels of public policy); FED. R Evm. 408 (dealing with "Compromises and Offers to Compromise").
3. 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
4. 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
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the confidentiality rule may exist; rulemakers, whether judicial or
legislative, must weigh their policy implications and provide participants in advance with clear rules as to how they will be handled.
Otherwise, participants will receive overbroad assurances of confidentiality, raising their expectations and simultaneously disappointing them as the rules fall to inevitable challenges and breach.
Contrary to their intent, strict enforcement of broad guarantees of
confidentiality will undermine participants' confidence in confidentiality rules and ultimately jeopardize the integrity of the mediation
process.
1. THE

FACTS OF PARANZINO

In Paranzino, Victoria Paranzino sued Barnett Bank for breach
of contract. 5 She alleged that she went to a Barnett branch with
$200,000 in cash to purchase two $100,000 certificates of deposit, but
that Barnett issued her only one $100,000 certificate despite her
transmittal of $200,000 to the bank's teller. 6
Pending litigation, the parties attended court-ordered mediation. 7 Subsequent to the mediation, the bank offered to settle. 8
Paranzino rejected the proposa1. 9 Though the parties signed a written agreement binding them to confidentiality, about five months after the proffered settlement Paranzino, her daughter, and her
attorney divulged to the Miami Herald their view of the case. 10 They
related not only their version of the facts but also the specific terms of
Barnett's settlement offer.ll
Following the publication of the Paranzino's account in the Herald, the bank moved to strike Paranzino's pleadings and to impose
sanctions, on the ground that Paranzino breached the court-ordered
confidentiality clause of the mediation agreement signed by the participants. 12 The trial court granted both requests, dismissing the
case with prejudice, the severest possible sanction. 13
In sustaining the striking of plaintiffs pleadings as well as the
dismissal, the appellate court determined that by disclosing details of
the mediation proceedings, Paranzino had "disregarded the court's
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

690 So. 2d at 726.
id.
id.
id.

690 So. 2d at 726.
id. at 726-27.
id.
id. at 727.

690 So. 2d at 727.
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authority."14 The signed mediation agreement and the rules referenced therein mandated confidentiality. IS
The appellate court also determined that the trial court exercised
proper discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. 16 It reasoned
that " [i]f the trial court were to allow this willful and deliberate conduct to go unchecked, continued behavior in this vein could have a
chilling effect upon the mediation process."17 Adopting the strict language cited in other Florida cases, the court stated firmly that
"[w]here the parties do not effectuate a settlement agreement ... the

confidentiality afforded to parties must remain inviolate."18
II. THE

FACTS OF BERNARD

In Bernard, Peter Bernard and the other plaintiffs sued for a preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver in a patent,
copyright, and trademark suit. 19 Despite the plaintiffs' objections,
the trial judge referred the case to mediation. 2o The parties were informed of the confidential nature of the proceedings via the written
notice of selection of a mediator, by at least one court order, and by
the mediator himself.21
Shortly after the mediation commenced, the parties related conflicting accounts of the mediation through unsolicited letters to the
judge. The plaintiffs' lead counsel, Donald Cornwell, accused the defendants of "fall[ing] to make any serious settlement offer," making
the mediation as "a very expensive waste oftime."22 The defendants
responded that "they ha[d] offered more than is justified or reasonable and have done everything they can to resolve the matter" and
requested that the judge "keep the mediation process open."23
14. See id.
15. See id. (referencing FLA. STAT. ch. 44.102(3) and FLA. R. CN. P. 1.73).
16. See id. at 729.
17. 690 So. 2d at 729.
18. Id. at 728 (emphasis added) (citing Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.,
641 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994». See also, Royal Caribbean v. Modesto, 614
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
All of these cases involve participants who disclosed proposed settlement terms because they erroneously thought the settlement was final, although they were not in
writing or signed as required by the court and therefore did not meet the standard
permitting for disclosure.
19. 901 F. Supp. at 780.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 781.
23. 901 F. Supp. at 781.
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In a subsequent letter to the judge, Cornwell argued that the defendants' claim "that they have attempted in good faith to settle" constituted "an outrageous attempt to mislead the court."24 Cornwell
then asserted that the defendant's characterization of the process
compelled the plaintiffs to "embroil the Court in the details of the
parties' settlement discussions . . . in order to set the record
straight."25 Accordingly, he divulged to the judge details of the mediation process, including the specific terms of settlement offers proposed by both the defendants and the plaintiffs. 26
Upon learning of Cornwell's detailed disclosures, the defendants'
counsel requested sanctions for violating the confidentiality mandated by the court order and the mediation provisions. 27 In defense,
Cornwell argued that the defendants "opened the door" by "[choosing]
to inform the Court about the mediation process in violation of this
Order and deliberately misrepresented the parties' respective settlement positions to the COurt."28 Furthermore, he claimed, he ''had no
choice, in view of the defendants' letters to the Court, but to disclose
'exactly what the status of the [settlement] discussions were."'29
Judge Denny Chin disagreed. He found that the defendants had
made no statements that "opened the door" to discussions of the mediation communications. 30 Moreover, the judge determined that
Cornwell's claim that he ''had no choice" but to breach confidentiality
was unjustified, as he could have objected to the defendants' characterizations of the mediation without divulging specific details about
the settlement amounts, a disclosure that directly violated the court
order of confidentiality.31
Accordingly, Judge Chin levied a fine of $2,500 against
Cornwel1. 32 Adopting the language of the Second Circuit, he reasoned that "if participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment
of everything that transpires during [mediations] then counsel of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious,
tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in
a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 781-82.
See id. at 782.
See 901 F. Supp. at 782.
Id. at 782-83.
See id.
See id. at 782.
See 901 F. Supp. at 783.
See id. at 785.

Spring 1998]

Confidentiality in Mediation

289

resolution of a civil dispute. "33 In applying this analogy to the mediation process of his own jurisdiction, Judge Chin noted that
"[p]articipants in the Mediation Program rely on the understanding
that all matters discussed during the mediation process will be kept
confidential, and the breach of the applicable confidentiality provisions threatens the integrity of the entire Program."34
ill. A

STRONG COMMITMENT TO CONFIDENTIALITY: JUSTIFIED BOTH
ON THE FACTS AND IN THEORY

Paranzino and Bernard show that courts are willing to use their
strongest judicial powers to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation process, an approach supported by the facts of the cases and also
by a central tenet of mediation theory: that the process inherently
requires a substantial guarantee of confidentiality t-O be effective.
Based on the facts, the participants were appropriately penalized
for blatantly ignoring their obligations to keep confidentiality. In
both cases, the sanctioned participants questioned whether they were
bound to confidentiality at all, despite clear evidence that they had
given meaningful consent to their duties of confidentiality. In
Paranzino, the parties executed and signed a "Mediation Report and
Agreement," which forbid them to "disclose any discussions" and
which also referenced the appropriate state statutes and rule of civil
procedure that more thoroughly delineated the confidentiality requirements.35 In Bernard, the mediator orally t-Old the participants
of their responsibility, and the court also issued two written orders
clearly stating: "The entire mediation process is confidential. The
parties and the Mediator may not disclose information regarding the
process, the settlement terms, to the court or to third parties unless
all parties otherwise agree."3G However, the sanctioned counsel in
Bernard admitted that he simply "didn't pay attention t-O" the court
order.37 In light of these facts, the courts rejected both parties'
claims of ignorance and found their breaches to be willful and deliberate.3S Disturbed by the parties' failure to consider both the importance of confidentiality and the court's authority to regulate their
33. [d. at 784 (quoting Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608
F.2d 928, 930 (2nd Cir. 1979».
34. [d. at 784.
35. See 901 F. Supp. at 783.
36. [d. at 780.
37. [d. at 782.
38. See id. at 784; 690 So. 2d at 728-29 (affirming trial court finding).
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actions in the proceedings, both courts took appropriately powerful
steps to deter similar breaches of confidentiality.
The need for strong deterrence is based on the premise that mediation will not be effective if participants are not assured of a substantial guarantee of confidentiality.39 As the Paranzino court
recognized, allowing breaches of confidentiality to go "unchecked"
would have a "chilling effect upon the mediation process."40 There
are at least two ways in which confidentiality plays a critical role in
the mediation process: it affords the parties the freedom to participate fully by protecting both general communications and specific
settlement offers from disclosure to either the courts or to third parties, and it also protects the integrity of the mediator's role in the
process.
It is crucial that parties feel free from fear of disclosure of mediation communications to either the court or to third parties. 41 Mediation asks its participants to identify the full range of their interests
and encourages them to explore many ways to meet these interests. 42
Fully assessing these interests and options often means divulging to
the mediator and/or to the other participant sensitive personal information and emotional attitudes towards others.43 It might include
revealing sensitive business information, or making statements of
fact or law. 44 The breadth of a participant's revelations of such information, and thus the success of the mediation in addressing them,
clearly depends upon the degree of protection that participants have
against disclosure. 45 Parties without adequate protection against
disclosure will choose not to mediate, or, if ordered to mediate by a
court, will be less forthright.46 As the Bernard court noted, participants in non-confidential mediation proceedings ''will ... conduct
39. See generally, Bruce A. Biltman, Mediation in Florida: The Newly Emerging
Case Law, 70 FLA. B.J. 44 (1996); Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confi·
dentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 37 (1986);
Kirtley, supra note 1; Christopher H. Macturk, Note, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Best Protection Has Exceptions, 19 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 411 (1995); Note, Protect·
ing Confidentiality In Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 441 (1984).
40. 690 So. 2d at 729.
41. See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9-11; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415, 416; Note,
supra note 39, at 444-45.
42. See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38;
Macturk, supra note 39, at 415; Note, supra note 39, at 445.
43. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9.
44. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9.
45. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415.
46. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 50; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38;
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 17; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415; Note, supra note 39, at
445.
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themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more
suitable to poker players ...."47
Not only do participants require protection against personal embarrassment from potential disclosure to third parties or the public;
they also require assurances that mediation communications will not
disadvantage them in future court proceedings.48 For example, in
Bernard, the sanctioned disclosures were not made publicly but t{)
the presidingjudge.49 Participants require assurances that the mediation process, as an alternative to formal adjudication, will not be
abused as a means of introducing evidence and information that
otherwise would be undiscoverable or inadmissible in court.
In addition to general mediation communications, specific settlement terms (whether merely proposed or accepted) also deserve protection. Disclosing the terms of an offer, or even the fact that an offer
is made, might be damaging to participants if used as an example of
"proof' of wrongdoing,50 if perceived as an admission of guilt, or if
used as a comparative value on which similar judgments might be
based in the future. 51 For example, such disclosure of settlement
terms was sanctioned in Paranzino, where a newspaper printed the
settlement terms and statements claiming that "the bank would not
have made the offer unless it felt its case were shaky . ... [the bank)
handled the transaction badly, and ... the bank's lawyer knows it ...
"52 Such attempts to use mediation communications as evidence of
wrongdoing or to "try the case in public" must be prevented to avoid
chilling the possibilities of settlement.
Secondly, confidentiality is critical to the effectiveness of the mediator.53 Mediators must be perceived as and act as neutrals, actors
whose personal opinions are irrelevant to the process.54 The appearance of neutrality is substantively damaged if the mediator can be
called on to testify, either formally or informally, about the substance
47. 901 F. Supp. at 40.
48. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 50; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38;
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9-10; Macturk, supra note 39, at 416.
49. See 901 F. Supp. at 782.
50. See Note, supra note 39, at 447-50.
51. This includes future judgments either decided within the legal system or
made outside the courtroom, as in future mediations or less formal settings.
52. 690 So. 2d at 727.
53. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note I, at 8;
Macturk, supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 444-46, 456.
54. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note I, at 10, 3032; Macturk, supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 446.
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of the mediation, or about her opinion of the mediation or of the parties. 55 "Both the appearance and the reality of the mediator's neutrality are essential to generating the climate of trust necessary for
effective mediation. "56
In sum, the courts in Paranzino and Bernard are justified in that
the participants flagrantly disregarded their specified duties of confidentiality, duties that are critical to the integrity of the mediation
process. Broad confidentiality rules promote a critical degree of candor among the participants by shielding against the inappropriate
use of mediation information. Without strong confidentiality provisions and appropriate enforcement, parties' candor will diminish as
lax enforcement repeatedly guts legal promises of confidentiality.
IV.

CASES

ALso

ILLUSTRATE THE NEED FOR CAREFULLY DRAFI'ED
RULES AND EXCEPTIONS

Although the Paranzino and Bernard courts deserve praise for
taking strong stands on confidentiality, the bluntness of their formulas may in fact counteract their intent. Severe sanctions and strict
confidentiality rules fail to account for the complexity of the role of
confidentiality in mediation, and overlook potentially valid exceptions to the rule. Situations that might merit exceptions to confidentiality include, for example, where participants allege mediator
misconduct or other complaints about the process itself; where past
or possible future crimes are disclosed; and where the enforcement of
mediated agreements calls for parol evidence. Overbroad rules that
fail to address such situations not only reflect a lack of thoughtful
policy; they might in fact induce breach. Participants who do have
valid exceptions are constrained from addressing them by overbroad
mandates of confidentiality, and they might then turn to breach as
the only remedy for their concerns. The circumstances of Bernard
are suggestive of one such scenario, where the participants appear to
have been motivated to breach, at least in part, by an inability to
otherwise overcome what they perceived to be a critical flaw in the
mediation process (namely, bad-faith participation by the adverse
parties). Furthermore, even though it is often acceptable to carve out
exceptions to rules after-the-fact in judicial opinions, this means of
55. See James M. ABsey, Jr., Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and
Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 997 (1996); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 10, 30-32; Macturk,
supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 445-6.
56. Note, supra note 39, at 445.
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rule-refinement is wholly inappropriate for rules about confidentiality in mediation. For these reasons, broadly sweeping confidentiality
rules which are intended to strengthen the principle and bolster the
mediation process might in fact weaken both.

A

Exceptions May Exist

A number of exceptions have support in other literature and/or
have been implemented in various jurisdictions by statute, court rule,
or judicial opinion. Only a few will be mentioned here t~ provide examples of the range of concerns, but their policy considerations will
not be considered.
One example of a well-established exception is where participants challenge the integrity of the mediation process itself, and need
to refer to records or communications to support claims of misconduct
or injustice occurring in the mediation under the veil of confidentiality. In these instances, mediation arrangements might have the taint
of fraud, unfairness, or ambiguity; mediators might act in a biased
fashion. 57 Several jurisdictions have provided for such exceptions. 58
In another example, confidentiality in mediation is used to prevent
discovery in subsequent court proceedings - an inappropriate application of the rule. 59 A third possible exception is allowing use of mediation communications or settlement agreements as parol evidence
for enforcement. 60 Participants may need to refer not only to written
agreements to mediate, but also to communications or to settlement
agreements, in order to prove the understandings they reached or for
57. See McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that
an exception is appropriate to determine whether settlement was signed under duress); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 43; Kirtley, supra note I, at 49-52; Note,
supra note 39, at 452.
58. See e.g., Biltman, supra note 39, at 51 (referencing McKinlay, supra note 57';
Maturck, supra note 39, at 433 (describing Colorado exception for mediator discipline), Kirtley, supra note I, at 44 and n.303 (referencing Colorado, Florida, Utah,
and federal rules for mediator misconduct).
59. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 44; Kirtley, supra note I, at 39-41.
See also. FLA. STAT. ch. 44.201 (governing mediations of the Citizen Dispute Settlement Centers and specifying that where information discussed in mediations would
otherwise be discoverable in court proceedings, the confidentiality rule will not hinder
normal discovery proceedings); Macturk, supra note 39, at 432 (describing Wyoming's
discovery provision, ensuring that mediation is not effectively transformed into a burial place for parties' unfavorable evidence).
60. See Kirtley, supra note I, at 42-44; Macturk, supra note 39, at 429; Note,
supra note 39, at 452-54. See. e.g., Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376,
457 S.E.2d 36 (1995).
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other purposes. 61 This type of exception also has been written into a
number of confidentiality rules. 62 As a fourth example, rulemakers
have granted mediators or participants the freedom, or perhaps even
the obligation, to reveal admissions of past crimes or to disclose credible threats to cause physical harm, damage property, or otherwise
commit a crime. 63 Several jurisdictions have taken the position that
mediation should not serve as a shield for criminal acts. 64
Such policy considerations and many others certainly may weigh
in favor of limited disclosure and deserve careful deliberation by the
appropriate rule-making body.
B. Rules that Fail to Address Exceptions Might Encourage Breach

Where confidentiality rules fail to address such exceptions, the
rules may in fact encourage breach. One way in which this may occur
is with parties who sense that their situation may be a valid exception to the rule, but who are forbidden by confidentiality to assess
whether their situation does qualify for an exception with the assistance of the appropriate actors. Such parties may become frustrated
or confused by the confidentiality rule, and see breach as their only
recourse. While the outcome of Bernard is justified on its specific
facts, the case is nevertheless suggestive of how overbroad confidentiality rules might in this way encourage breach. 65
In Bernard, participants' only formal notice of their confidentiality duties consisted of court orders that failed to address any potential exceptions, aside from consent. The court orders simply stated:
"[T]he entire mediation process is confidential. The parties and the
Mediator may not disclose information regarding the process, including settlement terms, to the court or to third parties unless all parties
otherwise agree."66 However, the breaching party in Bernard
thought that he had a legitimate concern about the adverse party's
bad-faith participation, so detrimental to the mediation process that
61. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 51-52; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 42-44; Note,
supra note 39, at 452-54.
62. See FLA. STAT. ch. 900408; Macturk, supra note 39, at 429, 432.
63. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 31; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 44;
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 43-48.
64. See FLA. STAT. ch. 10.08 (creating exceptions for child abuse); Freedman &
Prigofif, supra note 39, at 44; Macturk, supra note 39, at 432, 438.
65. This is in contrast to Paranzino, where the breach does not appear to be motivated by such frustration. In addition, the participants in that case were formally
advised of Florida rules explaining two exceptions to confidentiality that had been
deliberated through a legitimate rulemaking process. See 690 So. 2d at 726.
66. 910 F. Supp. at 780 (emphasis added).
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he was unwilling to travel from out-of-state for further sessions. 67
Frustrated further by the representations of good-faith that were
made by the adverse parties, the breaching participant felt he "had
no choice" but to breach this rule in order to prove, through disclosure
"exactly what the status of the [settlement] discussions were."68
While in Bernard the court properly rejected this claim for other
reasons, the Bernard facts are suggestive of a situation where a participant might be induced to breach overbroad confidentiality rules.
It can be difficult to prove bad faith69 or other participant misconduct
without disclosing some information about the mediation, and it appears that the parties in Bernard had no guidance as t.o how to lodge
such a complaint without breaching confidentiality.7o Under such
circumstances, it is reasonable that participants might truly think
that there is "no choice" but to breach. If the rule appears overly
broad, and if the party thinks she has a valid exception to the rule yet
has no guidance as to how to remedy her situation within the confines
of the rule, she may see breach as the only way to assert or assess her
right to an exception.
Bernard suggests one way in which broadly stated rules, intended to give strong support to confidentiality rules, might backfire
and encourage breach. Such breaches can be avoided if rules eAlllicitly address potential exceptions, or, at minimum, if the rules provide
a way for participants to discuss their concerns without breaking
confidentiality.

c.

Creating Exceptions Through Post Hoc Common Law
Rulemaking Is Inappropriate for Confidentiality Rules

Traditionally, overbroad rules or laws are subject to refinement
through the judicial process by which case-by-case evaluations adjust
the rules to make appropriate exceptions. However, in the case of
mediation confidentiality, this means of addressing exceptions is
wholly inappropriate in that it inherently contradicts the principle of
confidentiality.
67. See id. at 781-82.
68. Id. at 782.
69. For a discussion on implementing a bad-faith e.xception, see Kirtley, supra
note 1, at 49-51.
70. The only guidance given to the participants appears to be the vaguely worded
court order and the Guide to the Court's Civil Justice EAllense and Delay Reduction
Plan, which was relied upon by the Bernard court in crafting its court order on confidentiality, although it is entirely unclear whether it covers any exceptions or whether
the parties were referred to it or given access to it. See 901 F. Supp. at 779-80.
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Overbroad confidentiality rules, like any other overbroad rules,
are susceptible to judicially-created exceptions being carved out after
the fact-after mediation is over. The difficulty is that broad assurances explicitly establish high expectations of confidentiality, but
these expectations are also likely to be scuttled as participants challenge the rules, either informally as in Bernard or formally via the
post hoc judicial exception-making process. The danger of contravening expectations in this way is that participants will conclude that
the initial assurances of confidentiality had no substantive meaning,
and may question the integrity of the entire process. This is substantially damaging to mediation because, for the reasons explained
above, the success of the mediation depends to a great extent on how
much faith participants have in the assurance confidentiality when
they enter the process; repeated violations of parties' expectations
will decrease the public's faith in the mediation process. Thus, exceptions must not only be clearly stated, but their creation should not be
left to traditional post hoc judicial deliberation.
Substantively, potential exceptions deserve thoughtful analysis
as to their policy ramifications; structurally, they are critical to the
integrity of the mediation process. At a minimum, rules should provide some means by which participants safely may address their concerns about confidentiality and possible exceptions. Otherwise,
participants will challenge the rule (either formally or informally)
and will violate the expectations it created, jeopardizing the public's
faith in confidentiality and thus in mediation.

v.

SUMMARY

Although a strong commitment to confidentiality on the part of
the judiciary is appropriate and essential to the success of mediation,
hard-line rules might be inadequate to address the complexity of confidentiality rules and the need for exceptions. While judicial orders
may encourage participants to take confidentiality seriously by
speaking in plain language and with conviction, such simplistic orders cannot serve as a proxy for a full and well-developed body of
regulation. Clearly, egregious breaches such as those in Paranzino
and Bernard require strong deterrence. But such strict adherence to
confidentiality is not always appropriate, and exceptions must be considered as a matter of good policy-making. Furthermore, overly strict
confidentiality rules might in fact induce breach when parties feel
they have no other means of asserting or assessing their entitlement
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to an exception. Feeble guarantees of confidentiality and lax enforcement clearly deter full participation in the mediation process; overbroad rules and enforcement may have a similar effect.
Clear, pre-established rules that address concerns about exceptions are especially critical because post hoc exception-making counteracts one of the central goals of mediation confidentiality-assuring
freedom from fear of disclosure when participants enter the process.
In cases where courts craft exceptions after the fact, they defeat the
initial guarantees of confidentiality, jeopardizing the integrity of the
rules. By imposing oversimple confidentiality rules that ignore possible exceptions, courts that intend to promote mediation and
strengthen its foundations may well end up weakening the public's
confidence in the process.

